东南法学

参考文献

(1) Robert Alexy. Constitutional Rights and Proportionality. Revus,No.22(2014),p.52

(1) Robert Alexy. Balancing,Constitutional Review,and Representation. International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.3(2005),p.573.

(2) Alec Stone Sweet,Jud Matthews. Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,Vol.47(2008),p.108.

(3) Paul W. Kahn. The Court,the Community and the Judicial Balance:The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell. The Yale Law Journal,Vol.97(1987),p.3.作者指出，“‘权衡’本身就是模糊和抽象的隐喻……抽象的权衡概念无法告知我们哪些权利、原则和价值具有重要性以及它们是如何被赋予权重的”。

(4) Jürgen Habermas. Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. MIT Press,1996,pp.259-260.

(5) Jürgen Habermas. Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. MIT Press,1996,p.258.

(6) Mattias Kumm,Alec D. Walen,Human Dignity and Proportionality Deontic Pluralism in Balancing. https：//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195663,p.4，最后访问日期：2020年3月15日。

(7) Jürgen Habermas. Between Facts and Norms:Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. MIT Press,1996,p.259.

(8) Stavros Tsakyrakis. Proportionality:An Assault on Human Rights? International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.7(2009),p.491.

(9) Bernhard Schlink.“Proportionality(1)”,in Michel. Rosenfeld,Andras Sajóeds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press,2012,p.734.

(10) Bernhard Schlink. Abw?gung im Verfassungsrecht. Broschiert,1976,pp.136-137.

(11) Bernhard Schlink.“Proportionality(1)”,in Michel Rosenfeld,Andras. Sajóeds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press,2012,p.735.

(1) Bernhard Schlink. Abw?gung im Verfassungsrecht. Broschiert,1976,pp.192-193.

(2) Marko Novak. Three Models of Balancing(in Constitutional Review). Ratio Juris,Vol.23(2010),p.102.

(3) Robert Alexy. The Construction of Constitutional Rights. Law&Ethics of Human Rights,Vol.4(2010),pp.21-22.

(4) Francisco J. Urbina. A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing. Cambridge University Press,2017,pp.55-56.

(5) Grégoire C. N. Webber. Proportionality,Balancing and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,Vol.23(2010),pp.180-181.

(6) Stavros Tsakyrakis. Proportionality:An Assault on Human Rights? International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.7(2009),p.475.

(7) Francisco J. Urbina. A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing. Cambridge University Press,2017,pp.115-116.

(8) Stavros Tsakyrakis. Proportionality:An Assault on Human Rights? International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.7(2009),p.492.

(9) Giorgio Bongiovanni,Chiara Valentini.“Balancing,Proportionality and Constitutional Rights”,in Giorgio. Bongiovanni,Giovanni Sartori,Chiara Valentini eds. Reasonableness and Law. Springer,2018,p.603.

(1) Robert Alexy. Constitutional Rights,Balancing,and Rationality. Ratio Juris,Vol.2(2003),pp.131-132.

(2) Robert Alexy. Rights and Liberties as Concepts,in Michel Rosenfeld&Andras Sajóeds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press,2012,p.293.

(3) Robert Alexy. Rights and Liberties as Concepts,in Michel Rosenfeld&Andras Sajóeds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press,2012,p.291.

(4) Robert Alexy. Rights and Liberties as Concepts,in Michel Rosenfeld&Andras Sajóeds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press,2012,p.294.

(5) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.75.

(6) Robert Alexy. Rights and Liberties as Concepts,in Michel Rosenfeld&Andras Sajóeds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press,2012,p.291.

(7) Robert Alexy. The Construction of Constitutional Rights. Law&Ethics of Human Rights,Vol.4(2010),p.24.

(8) Bernhard Schlink.“Proportionality(1)”,in Michel Rosenfeld,Andras. Sajóeds. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press,2012,p.730.

(1) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003),pp.436-437.

(2) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003), p.440.阿列克西指出“生命权比一般性的自由权具有更高的抽象性价值”。

(3) Dieter Grimm. Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence. University of Toronto Law Journal,Vol.57(2007),p.396.

(4) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003),p.440; BVerf GE 35,202,Preamble,para.2.德国宪法法院在Lebach案判决中指出“总体上，人的尊严和表达自由无法抽象地比较孰高孰低”。

(1) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.102.

(2) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003),p.442.

(3) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003),p.440.

(4) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003), p.440.

(5) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003),p.445.

(6) Robert Alexy. Verfassungrecht und einfaches Recht-Verfassungsgerichtbarkeit und Fachgerichtbarkeit. Ver?ffentlichugen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer,vol.61(2002),ff.25.

(1) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003),p.446.

(2) Robert Alexy.“Proportionality and Rationality”,in Vicki C. Jackon,Mark Tushnet eds. Proportionality:New Frontiers,New Challenges. Cambridge University Press,2017,p.18.

(3) Robert Alexy. Proportionality and Rationality,in Vicki C. Jackon,Mark Tushnet eds. Proportionality:New Frontiers,New Challenges. Cambridge University Press,2017,p.18.

(4) Grégoire C. N. Webber. Proportionality,Balancing and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,Vol.23(2007),p.191.

(1) Stjin Smet. Resolving Conflicts between Human Rights:The Judge’s Dilemma. Routledge,2016,p.193.

(2) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.105.

(3) Lorenzo Zucca. Constitutional Dilemmas:Conflicts of Fundamental Rights in Europe and the USA. Oxford University Press,2007,p.20.“阿列克西的宪法权利理论并没有提供政治道德的理论内容。”

(4) Grégoire C. N. Webber. Proportionality,Balancing and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,Vol.23(2010),p.199.

(5) Grégoire C. N. Webber. Proportionality,Balancing and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,Vol.23(2010),p.193.

(6) Robert Alexy.“Thirteen Replies”,in G. Pavlakos ed. Law,Rights and Discourse:Themes from the Legal Philosophies of Robert Alexy. Hart Publishing,2007,p.344.“权重公式内容意味着比例原则的分析模式依赖于外部证成的形式性结构……对影响权利程度的观点判断不能依赖于合比例性的分析。不含有观点判断的比例原则具有任意性和机械性。必须要以符合法律主张的方式分析基本权利。”

(7) Virgilio Alfonso da Silva. Comparing the Incommensurable:Constitutional Principles,Balancing and Rational Decisions.Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,Vol.31(2011),p.288.

(1) Mattias Kumm.“Political Liberalism and Structure of Rights:On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement”,in G. Pavlakos ed. Law,Rights and Discourse:The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy. Hart Publishing,2007,p.148.

(2) Mattias Klatt,Moritz Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford University Press,2012,pp.62-63;Kai M?ller. Proportionality:Challenging the Critics. International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.10(2012),pp.719-721.三位学者指出相冲突的宪法利益即便有不可通约性，也应该归类为“弱的不可通约性”范畴，可以通过特定权利的优胜理论（triumph）、权利的有效边界理论（side-constraint）和权利的排序理论（lexical order）解决冲突。

(3) Virgilio Alfonso da Silva. Comparing the Incommensurable:Constitutional Principles,Balancing and Rational Decisions.Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,Vol.31(2011),p.282.赞同均衡性原则的学者普遍认为“可通约性”与“可比较性”应该表达为不同的排序方式。“可通约性”代表基数性排序（cardinal order），而“可比较性”意味着顺序性排序。参见Ruth Chang.“Introduction”,in Ruth Chang ed. Incommensurability,Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press,1998,p.1.

(4) Kai M?ller. Proportionality:Challenging the Critics. International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.10(2012),p.721.“沃顿认为‘权衡’（balance）的语义不仅指定量或者成本-收益的分析，同时也指在‘两个相冲突的价值间推理和主张的权衡’……因此，我主张将‘权衡’概念理解为‘权衡一切相关的考量因素’”。Mattias Klatt,Moritz Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford University Press,2012,p.62。“实际上，权衡的过程提供了道德性的论理（moral reasoning）。更为重要的是，权衡过程展示了在哪个阶段或者何种程度上道德性论理对法律主张是必要的……萨基拉基斯认为‘在道德词语缺失的情况下，将无法证明宪法价值具有可通约性’。我们非常认同他的观点。”

(5) Mattias Klatt,Moritz Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford University Press,2012,p.69.

(6) Niels Petersen. Alexy and the “German” Model of Proportionality:Why the Theory of Constitutional Rights Does Not Provide a Representative Reconstruction of the Proportionality Test. German Law Journal,Vol.21(2020),p.165; Stjin Smet.Resolving Conflicts between Human Rights:The Judge’s Dilemma. Routledge,2016,p.186;Kai M?ller. Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional Rights. International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.5(2007),p.465.

(1) Lars Lindahl.“On Robert Alexy’s Weight Formula for Weighing and Balancing”,in A. Silva Dias ed. Liber Amicorum de Joséde Sousa e Brito. Edicoes Almendina,2009,p.373.

(2) Grégoire C. N. Webber. Proportionality,Balancing and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence,Vol.23(2010),pp.195-197.韦伯采取了绝对批判的态度否定了权衡法则与选择结果间的正当关系。这不仅体现在他反对阿列克西的权重公式，也体现在他与克拉特和穆勒的观点截然相反。韦伯认为只有明确的和可衡量的成本-收益分析方法才具有可通约性。道德性论理不是权衡法则的必需品。另外，权衡过程不包括对于各种理由的考量。由于理由仅是做出选择的一种原因，不能证明该理由优于其他选择的理由。因此，权衡法则的结果并不具有严密的客观性和排他的逻辑性。

(3) Robert Alexy. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. Ratio Juris,Vol.16(2003),p.447.

(1) Stjin Smet. Resolving Conflicts between Human Rights:The Judge’s Dilemma. Routledge,2016,p.194.

(2) Mattias Klatt,Moritz Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford University Press,2012,p.69.

(3) Mattias Klatt,Moritz Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford University Press,2012,pp.69-70.

(4) Mattias Klatt,Moritz Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford University Press,2012,p.60.

(5) 1991年哥伦比亚宪法第334条规定“任何情况下，宪法权利的核心部分不可受到影响”；2010年肯尼亚宪法第24条第2款第3项规定“立法条款对宪法权利和自由的限制不得损害权利和自由的核心或者本质部分”。

(6)南非宪法法院在S vs. Makwanyane的判决中审查实施死刑是否侵犯生命权。萨克（Sache）大法官在判决中运用了“保障宪法权利的内核理论”。参见范继增：《人权法的移植的成功与挫折》，载张善仁：《南京大学法律评论》（2015年春季卷），法律出版社，2015年，第65页。

(1) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.193.

(2)参见BVerf Ge 34,238,245.德国宪法法院秘密录音带案件中指出“由于那些极其重要的公共利益不能成为限制具有绝对排它性的个人生活权内核部分的正当理由，因此在该案中不适用比例原则中的均衡性原则”。

(3) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.195.

(4) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.193.

(5) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.195.

(1) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,pp.195-196.

(2)《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》和众多区域性国际人权条约皆规定了绝对权利。例如，免于酷刑、免于不人道或者有辱人格的处罚、不得对他人施加奴役、思想与持有见解的自由。绝对权利意味着其他人享有绝对的道德性义务，不得依据任何主张和理由剥夺或者限制绝对权利。

(3) Robert Alexy. A Theory of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2002,p.75.

(4)在这里“，双重权衡”是指通过权衡方式寻找“基本权利的内核”和确认特定的限制措施是否符合均衡性原则的过程。

(5) Robert Alexy.“Thirteen Replies”. in G. Pavlakos ed. Law,Rights and Discourse:Themes from the Legal Philosophies of Robert Alexy. Hart Publishing,2007,p.344.

(6) Mattias Klatt,Moritz Meister. The Constitutional Structure of Proportionality. Oxford University Press,2012,p.32.

(1) Kai M?ller. The Global Model of Constitutional Rights. Oxford University Press,2012,p.148.

(2) Aharon Barak. Proportionality and Principled Balancing. Law&Ethics of Human Rights,Vol.4(2010),p.12.

(3) Aharon Barak. Proportionality:Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation. Cambridge University Press,2012,p.362.

(4) Aharon Barak. Proportionality:Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation. Cambridge University Press,2012,p.361.“不是所有的宪法权利都具有相同的社会重要性。一项宪法权利的社会重要性与防止该宪法权利受到限制的边际社会重要性都是由社会的根本认知决定的。不同社会的文化、历史和特征塑造了这些认知的形成，而认知又是由宪法目的派生出来的。我们可以将其称为权利的‘外在’属性。我们也可以从权利的‘内在’属性思考问题。例如，当行使某一项权利是行使其他权利的前提条件时，就意味这项基础性权利具有更高的社会重要性。”

(5) Aharon Barak. Proportionality:Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation. Cambridge University Press,2012,p.346.

(6) Joseph Raz.“On the Nature of Rights”,in J. Raz ed. The Morality of Freedom. Clarendon Press,1988,p.184.

(7) Aharon Barak. Proportionality:Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation. Cambridge University Press,2012,p.351.

(1) Jeremy Waldron. Fake Incommensurability:A Response to Professor Schauer. Hasting Law Journal,Vol.43(1994),pp.816-817.

(2) Aharon Barak. Proportionality:Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation. Cambridge University Press,2012,p.361.“对社会重要性的确定既不可能是科学的，也不可能是准确的。我们没有办法通过科学的工具在相互冲突的原则之间进行权衡。相反，权衡的方法产生于不同的经济和政治意识形态之中，存在于特定国家的独特历史进程和政治结构与不同的价值中。”

(3) Aharon Barak. Proportionality:Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation. Cambridge University Press,2012,p.486.

(4) Aharon Barak. Proportionality:Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation. Cambridge University Press,p.350.

(5) HCJ 7052/03 Adalah,Opinion of President Aharon Barak,paras. 92-93.

(6) Ariel L. Bendor,Tal Sela. How Proportional is Proportionality?. International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.13(2015),p.542.

(7) Eric Engal. The History of General Principle of Proportionality:An Overview. The Dartmouth Law Journal,Vol.5(2012),p.8.

(1)霍姆斯和庞德认为应通过权衡利益解决权利的冲突。具体内容请参见，Oliver W. Holmes. The Path of Law. Harvard Law Review,Vol.10(1897),p.467.“我认为法官们没能足够注意他们的任务是在不同的社会重要性（social advantage）之间进行权衡。”Benjamin Nathan Cardozo. The Paradoxes of legal Science. the Lawbook Exchange,Ltd,2000,pp.72-73.“面对这些问题，显然我们需要权衡不同的社会利益并且作出合比例的价值选择……司法过程每一步都是对社会利益的权衡……要想找到答案，就必须衡量不同的利益，权衡不同的价值，诉诸社会的道德、情感、经验和经济的情况。”

(2) Francisco J. Urbina. A Critique to Proportionality and Balancing. Cambridge University Press,2017,p.101.

(3)雷磊：《基本权利、原则与原则权衡——读阿列克西〈基本权利论〉》，载《法律方法》2011年第1期，第396页。

(4) Niels Petersen. Alexy and the “German” Model of Proportionality:Why the Theory of Constitutional Rights Does Not Provide a Representative Reconstruction of the Proportionality Test. German Law Journal,Vol.21(2020),p.166.

(1) John Hasnas. From Cannibalism to Caesareans:Two Conceptions of Fundamental Rights. Northwest University Law Review,Vol.89(1995),p.921.

(2) Wesley N. Hohfeld. Some Fundamental Legal Conception as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. Yale Law Journal,Vol.23(1913),pp.32-33.

(3) Stjin Smet. On the Existence and Nature of Conflicts between Human Rights at the European Court of Human Rights.Human Rights Law Review,Vol.17(2017),p.508.

(1) Judgement of the Portuguese Constitutional Court No.460/2011,11 October 2011,point2.4.

(2) Case C-34/09[2011] ECR I-1252,para.42.

(3) Case C-362/14,M Schrems vs. Data Protection Commission,judgment 6 October 2015,para.94.

(4) Takis Tridimas,Giulia Gentile. The Essence of Rights:An Unreliable Boundary?. German Law Journal,Vol.20(2019),p.804.

(5) Case C-426/11,Mark Alemo-Herron and Others vs. Parkwood Leisure Ltd,judgment 18 July 2013,para.35.

(6)范继增：《欧洲人权法院适用比例原则的功能与逻辑》，载《欧洲研究》2015年第5期，第107页。

(1) Ashingdane vs. UK,appl no.8225/78,judgment 28 May 1985,para.57.

(2) Sébastien van Drooghenbroeck,Cecilia Rizcallah. The ECHR and the Essence of Fundamental Rights:Searching for Sugar in Hot Milk?. German Law Journal,Vol.20(2019),p.910.

(3) Mouvement raelien suisse vs. Swizerland,appl no.16354/06,judgment 13 July 2012. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque,fn.32.

(4) Lingens vs. Austria,appl no. 9815/82,judgment 8 July 1986,para.41.“欧洲人权法院认为《欧洲人权公约》第10条保障的表达自由构成了民主社会的本质基础和推动社会进步、实现个人愿望的基本条件。所以，《欧洲人权公约》第10条不仅保障那些没有侵犯性和没有任何影响性的‘信息’和‘观点’，也会保护那些具有‘侵犯性’‘震撼性’和‘阻碍性’的观点。这是建立多元、宽容和开明的民主社会的必需。”Orban&Others vs. France,appl no. 20985/05,judgment 15 January2009,para. 52.

(5) Maja Brkan. The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order:Peeling the Onion to its Core.European Constitutional Law Review,Vol.14(2018),p.32.

(6)参见Council of Europe. Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Strasbourg,Update to 31August 2019,https：//www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf，最后访问日期：2021年3月15日。虽然《欧洲人权公约》第6条公平审判权不是绝对权利，但是该文件第87段明确指出“任何限制和缩减个人寻求法庭救济的方法都不得侵犯公平审判权的内核”。

(7) John Murray vs. UK,appl no. 18731/91,judgment 8 February 1996,para. 49.

(8) Heaney&McGuinness vs. Ireland,appl no. 34720/97,judgment 21 December 2000,paras.55-58.

(1) Case C-362/14,M Schrems vs. Data Protection Commission,judgment 6 October 2015,para.95.“未能向个人提供任何法律救济途径的立法……就是未达到尊重《欧盟基本权利宪章》第47条规定的司法保障权的内核”。Baka vs. Hungary,appl no.20261/12,judgment 13 June 2016,para.121.欧洲人权法院认为匈牙利议会立法提前终止本国最高法院院长的任期，并拒绝司法机构审查议会决定的行为侵犯了当事人寻求法庭救济权的内核。

(2) Na?t-Liman v. Switzerland,appl no.51357/07,judgment 15 March 2018. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wojtycezk,para.8.沃依提杰克法官在少数意见中认为多数法官在该案中适用“维护权利内核”的司法原则是不适当的。“当下，权利内核的概念既没有被进一步地解释，也不能被有效地适用，所以适用此司法原则无法为缔约国提供明确的公约义务范围和促进法律确定性。”

(3) M. Danson. The Governance of EU Fundamental Rights. Cambridge University Press,2017,p.64.作者认为欧盟法院形成的判例法体系未能清楚地划定基本权利的“内核”和“外围”部分的界限。Julian Rivers. Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review. The Cambridge Law Journal,Vol.65(2006),pp.184-185.作者指出欧洲人权法院很少在案件中提及“基本权利的内核”。甚至，即使判定了对“基本权利内核部分构成了侵犯”，也并非先行界定内核的范围，而是指“国家的行为对公约权利构成了严重的侵犯”。see Young,James&Webster vs. UK,appl nos. 7601/76,7806/77,judgment 13 August1981,para.65.虽然欧洲人权法院认为“强迫工人参加工会的权利可能会影响《欧洲人权公约》第11条保障结社自由的本质内容”，但是欧洲人权法院没有因此决定英国违反公约义务，而是“认为缔约国裁判结果超出了正当权衡结果的范围”。另外，涂尔肯法官在Sahin案的少数判决中基于“欧洲人权法院多数法官未在诉讼人因禁止参加考试而失去继续在本国大学接受医学教育和失去在本国从事医生职业的机会与土耳其政府禁止佩戴头巾受益之间进行权衡”，而是认定禁止佩戴头巾的学生参加考试损害了受教育权的内核部分。

(1) Case C-129/14 PPU,Spasic,Judgment 27 May 2014,paras.58-59.

(2) Barfod vs. Denmark,appl no.11508/85,judgment 22 February 1989,para.29.

(3) Goodwin vs. UK,appl no.17488/90,judgement 27 March 1996,Para.39

(4) Yutaka Arai-Takahashi. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR. Intersentia,2002,p.134.

(5) Lingens vs. Austria,appl no. 9815/82,judgment 8 July 1986,para.42.

(6) Matthews vs. UK,appl no.24833/94,judgment 18 February 1999,paras.64-65.

(1) Sahin vs. Turkey,appl no.44774/98,judgment 10 November 2005,para.154.

(2) Lingens vs Austria,appl no.9815/82,judgment 8 July 1986,para.42; Ashby Donald&Others vs. France,appl no.36769/08,judgment 10 January 2013,para.39.

(1) Micheal Fordham,Thomas de la Mare.“Identifying the Principles of Proportionality”,in Jeffrey L. Jowell,Jonathan Cooper eds. Understanding Human Rights Principle. Hart Publishing,2001,p.28.

(2) R vs. Oakes[1986] 1 SCR 103.

(1) Cfr Alastair Mowbray. A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review,Vol.10(2010),p.290.参见1968年欧洲人权法院在比利时语言案中的判决。

(2) Frederick Schauer.“Proportionality and Question of Weight”,in Grant Huscroft,Bradley W. Miller,Grégoire Webber eds. Proportionality and Rule of Law:Rights,Justification and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press,2014,p.175.

(3) Frederick Schauer.“Proportionality and Question of Weight”,in Grant Huscroft,Bradley W. Miller,Grégoire Webber eds. Proportionality and Rule of Law:Rights,Justification and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press,2014,p.176.

(4) Frederick Schauer.“Proportionality and Question of Weight”,in Grant Huscroft,Bradley W. Miller,Grégoire Webber eds.,Proportionality and Rule of Law:Rights,Justification and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press,2014,p.180

(5) Frederick Schauer.“Proportionality and Question of Weight”,in Grant Huscroft,Bradley W. Miller,Grégoire Webber eds.,Proportionality and Rule of Law:Rights,Justification and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press,2014,p.176.

(1) Niels Petersen. Alexy and the “German” Model of Proportionality:Why the Theory of Constitutional Rights Does Not Provide a Representative Reconstruction of the Proportionality Test. German Law Journal,Vol.21(2020),p.169.

(2) Hutten-Czapska vs Poland,appl no. 35017/97,judgment 19 June 2006,para. 167.

(3) Niels Petersen. Alexy and the “German” Model of Proportionality:Why the Theory of Constitutional Rights Does Not Provide a Representative Reconstruction of the Proportionality Test. German Law Journal,Vol.21(2020),p.170.

(4) Slivenko vs. Latvia,appl no.48321/99,judgment 9 October 2003,para.123

(1) Vogt vs. Germany,appl no.17851/91,judgment 26 September 1995,para.60.

(2) BVerfGE(1994),Entscheiden Der Amtlichen Sammlung 90,145(188).

(3) S v Makwanyane and Another(CCT3/94)[1995] ZACC 3,para.144-145.

(1) Kai M?ller. Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional Rights. International Journal of Constitutional Law,Vol.5(July2007),p.466.