东南法学

参考文献

(1)Giuseppe Martinico&Oreste Pollicino,The Interaction between Europea's Legal System;Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of Supranational Laws,Cheltenham;Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd,2012,p47-148.

(2)Alec Stone Sweet,A Cosmopolitan Legal Order;constitutional pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe,Global Constitutionalism,Vol.1,(March 2012),p67.

(1)Aida Torres Perez,Conflicts of Rights in the European Unioni A Theory of Supranational Adjudication,Oxford University Press,2009,p28;Alec Stone Sweet&Helen Keller,The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Order,in H,Keller&A.Stone,A Europe of Rights:The Impact of ECHR on National Legal System,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008,p20.21.两位作者指出人权公约在缔约国法律效力的差异性取决于以下几个因素:(1)一元论与二元论法律体系的差异;(2)司法与行政权限分配差异也会导致人权公约在各缔约国中法律地位的不同;(3)联邦制国家内部司法权的划分也会导致人权公约在国内法律地位具有差异性。Giuseppe Martinico,National Judges and Supranational Laws:Goals and Structure of the Research,In G.Martinico&O.Pollicino(eds),The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws:A Comparative Constitutional Perspective,Groningen,Europa Law Publishing,2010,p12-14.Martinieo将《欧洲人权公约》在国内法体系中的地位概括为如下几类t(1)缔约国宪法或者宪法性法律规定了《欧洲人权公约》在国内法中的地位,代表国家是奥地利和荷兰;(2)一些国家的法律体系将《欧洲人权公约》视为具有超越立法的地位(super-legislative status),代表国家有法国、比利时、西班牙和葡萄牙;(3)其他国家将《欧洲人权公约》赋予了立法性的地位,比如北欧国家、英国和德国;(4)意大利宪法法院通过第348/2009和349/2009号判决将《欧洲人权公约》视为宪法体系中的“中间性条款”(norma interposta),要求普通法院和行政法院在发现人权公约与国内法冲突的情况下需要适用“一致性解释”(consistent interpretation)。当普通法院发现无法通过该方式调解国际法与国内法的冲突时,需要将案件和相应的国内法提交至宪法法院,由宪法法院进行双重审查。《欧洲人权公约》在法国和比利时法律体系中具有影子宪法的作用。法国宪法委员会第88-1082号决定中直接适用了《欧洲人权公约》,并将其作为整体性合宪(b1oc de constitutionnalité)审查的一部分。这就意味着宪法委员会能够直接以《欧洲人权公约》作为审查国内立法合宪性的依据。1990年宪法委员会开始告诫法国议会的立法者“要尊重适用于共和国管辖下一切人的《国际人权公约》和具有宪法价值的保障个人权利与自由的基本法律”(Alec Stone Sweet&Helen Keller,The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Order,in H,Keller&A.Stone,A Europe of Rights;The Impact of ECHR on National Legal System,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008,p70.尽管《欧洲人权公约》在德国法律体系中仅与普通立法具有相同的法律地位,德国宪法法院也在很长的一段时间认为,即使德国作为人权诉讼的被告一方,德国法院也不必然要遵守人权法院的判决。但是,德国宪法法院在2005年的G?rgülü案的判决中指出,除非在极端的情况下成为宪法原则免受损害的唯一方法,德国法院需要适用人权法院的判决。如果德国法官忽视或者未能遵守《欧洲人权公约》,个人可以以此理由向德国宪法法院提出宪法申诉。2011年德国宪法法院指出人权公约与人权法院的判决可以作为“确定宪法所保障的基本权利范围和内容以及法治原则的参照标准”。

(2)参见第53条规定“缔约国或者任何欧洲机构都不得将任何公约条款解释为减低或者拒绝履行国内人权标准或者缔约国缔结的国际公约所保障的基本权利标准”。

(3)参见《欧洲人权公约》第14号议定书中第35条第3款第2段设定的案件受理标准反映出公约的边际裁量理论,其规定只要缔约国法院在国内审理程序中仔细地考虑了《欧洲人权公约》以及相关的人权法院判决,人权法院就可以拒绝受理申请人的诉讼请求。《欧洲人权公约》第15号议定书第1条规定:“依据《欧洲人权公约》的辅助性原则,欧洲理事会确认公约缔约国在保障人权公约和议定书规定的权利方面具有首要的义务与责任。为了确保缔约国当局能够适当地履行此责任-缔约国机构享有边际裁量(的权利),人权法院则对缔约国法院确定的边际裁量范围进行审查。”

(4)作者将“margin of appreciation”译为“边际裁量”。部分中国大陆和台湾作者还将此概念翻译为“自由裁量边际”“自由评判余地”“国家裁量余地”或“评判余地”。详见孙世彦:《欧洲人权制度中的“自由判断余地”原则》,载《环球法律评论》,2005年第3期;刘晓:《欧洲人权法院国家裁量余地原则研究》,南开大学法学硕士学位论文,2015;王玉叶:《欧洲人权法院审理原则——国家裁量余地》,载《欧美研究》,第36卷,第3期;郭冉:《论欧洲司法审查中的“自由裁量边际”理论》·载《太原理工大学学报》(社会科学版),2013年第4期;Lech Garlicki:《欧洲人权法院与评判余地原则——人权事务尚存几分国家自由裁量空间?》,翁燕菁译,载黄丞义编《2010行政管制与行政诉讼》,台北:中研院法律所。

(1)Herbert Petzold.The Convention and Principle of Subsidiarity,in Ronald St.J.Donald,Frantz Mascher,Herbert Petzold(eds),The European System for the Protection of Human Rights,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff,1993,p59.Petzold法官认为,边际裁量的适用直接源于辅助性原则。依据人权法院的法理,辅助性原则的基础是人权公约清楚地表明缔约国机关在国内法律秩序中具有保障权利和自由的优先性。这意味着尽管公约机构负有保障欧洲基本权利的实际任务,但是公约机构仅能在申请人穷尽国内救济后通过司法方式进行管辖。边际裁量理论是辅助性原则的自然产物。在公约框架下,边际裁量是在公约框架下将裁决权在缔约国法院和人权法院间进行合理的分配;并且,在具体的案件中划定缔约国法院具有“优先性”的裁量范围和国际法院的“监督”范围。

(2)Andreas Follesdal,The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in the International Law,Global Constitutionalism,vol.2,(March 2012),p41-50.人权法教授Folleadal认为“辅助性原则”学说分为五类:(1)“阿修西乌斯一自由”模式,即中央政府职责就是与地方性的加盟政府合作,以谋求各地方机构达成共识。(2)由美国邦联主义者和孟德斯鸠倡导的“邦联-自由”模式,即“个人不应该受到外界专制性意志的影响,并且小规模的团体组织内部应该分享特权”。(3)“实效-经济联邦主义”,即人民是权力的掌握者,从中获益的部分同时也要承担着共同美德的义务。这个概念实际是“社会团结精神”(solidarity)的具体表现。(4)“公正-天主教人格主义”模式。1891年教皇莱奥八世号召建立有限性政府以干预工人的经济生活时指出,“当任何一个阶级的利益已经遭受到不可避免的威胁与损坏时,公权力必须对此灾难进行处理。在此原则的指导下,实体而非程序层面的法律政府必须消除人民的苦难和弥补人民的损失”。此后,教皇皮尤斯六世在1931年进一步解释了“辅助性原则”的定义。他说;“当人民可以通过自己的努力创造私人的产业为社会作出贡献时,公权力就不要试图取代他们。最高的政府权力应该让社会团体自己建立属于他们自己的秩序·并且应该弱化对这些组织性事务的干涉。在遵守‘辅助性功能'的情况下,握有权力的社会组织一定可以繁荣发展和有效生产。”因此,Carozza教授延续了天主教的理念,将辅助性原则定义为“每一个政治和社会团体应该帮助一个更小的团体或者地方性组织完成其职责,但是不损及它们的自治性”。Paolo Carozza,Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,American Journal of International Law,vol.97,(March 2003),p38。(5)“自由契约主义”,即罗尔斯学派提出的“中央政府应该维护地方政府作出的民主且明智的决定。只要地方政府的决定维护了地方性利益并且不导致地方独立,中央政府就应该尽最大可能支持之”。

(3)参见第5条第3款规定:“辅助性原则是指,在欧盟法律体系管辖范围内,仅当缔约国的行动(proposed action)无法有效地达到其规定的目的时,欧盟可以对成员国中央政府、大区政府或者地方政府进行介入·并且以行动规模和效果为导向,联盟可以更好地实施该行为。”

(4)Federico Fabbrini,The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Subsidiarity:A Comparison,iCourts Working Papers Series,No.15,2015,p9-10.Fabbrini指出《欧盟法》体系的辅助性原则是应对欧盟权力不断膨胀的法律产物。《欧盟条约》第5条第3款设定了2个标准:“地方政府无法满足《欧盟法》的实施”以及“欧盟政府在实施《欧盟法》中具有比较的优势地位。”此外,在现今的《欧盟法》体系中,辅助性原则也成为当欧盟和成员国共享某些职权的情况下如何行使权力的导向。

(5)Andreas Von Staden,Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review beyond the State:The need for an appropriate standard of review,International Journal of Constitutional Law,vol.10,(October 2012),p1036.

(6)Martin Kuijer,The Right to a Fair Trial and the Council of Europe Efforts to Ensure Effective Remedies on a Domestic Level for Excessively Lengthy Proceedings,Human Rights Law Review,vol.13,(December 2013),p785.

(1)Fiona De Londras,Dual Functionality and Persistent Frailty of the European Court of Human Rights,European Human Rights Law Review,no.1,(January 2013),p40.

(2)Fiona De Londras,Dual Functionality and Persistent Frailty of the European Court of Human Rights,European Human Rights Law Review,no.1,(January 2013),p44.

(3)Alastair Mowbray,Subsidiarity and the European Convention on Human Rights,Human Rights Law Review,vol.15,(June 2015),p340.

(4)Jean-Paul Costa,The Relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and National Courts,European Human Rights Law Review,(August 2011),p268.

(5)Robert Spano,Universality or Diversity of Human Rights?Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity,Human Rights Law Review,Vol.14,(September 2014),p491.

(6)Dean Spieimann,Wither the Margin of Appreciation?,Current Legal Problems,vol 67,(August 2014),p53.Spielmann院长说:“我们必须要立刻回答一个问题,人权法院对何种事物进行辅助?不同于有些人认为人权法院的辅助对象是基于传统主权观念的国家权力,而是我们应该辅助缔约国的人权保障。"Mouvment Raelien Suisse vs.Switzerland,appl no.16354/06,judgment 13 July 2012.在本案判决中,异见法官们指出,“(与辅助性原则)相关的边际裁量是调整缔约国和人权法院有价值的互动性工具:这不意味着人权法院将会无条件地赞同缔约国的决定”。

(7)Matthew Saul,The European Court of Human Rights'Margin of Appreciation and the Process of National Parliament,Human Rights Law Review,vol.15,(December 2015),p762-767.

(8)Giuseppe Martinico&Oreste Pollicino,The Interaction between Europea's Legal Systemi Judicial Dialogue and the Creation of Supranational Laws,Cheltenham!Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd,2012,pl59.

(1)从MacCormick教授开始,欧洲的众多学者就开始对“宪法多元主义”理论进行探讨。MacCormick教授从《欧盟法》与国家宪法着手,认为欧洲宪法多元体系意味着国内法体系和超国家法体系之间的独立性,两个法律体系之间不具有隶属的关系,因此基于绝对主权观念产生的法律体系无法避免冲突的结果。Nico MacCormick,Questioning Sovereignty:Law,State,and Nation in the European Commonwealth,Oxfordi Oxford University Press,1999,p117.尽管《欧洲人权公约》不是超国家法,多数缔约国宪法文本或者宪法法院判决规定公约效力低于国家宪法·但是人权法院在个别判决中效仿欧盟法院的做法,从而努力将公约塑造成具有优先效力的法源。在Popescu VS.Romania案中,人权法院要求缔约国立法机构或者国内法院删除或者不适用与公约相冲突的国内法。而在Vannover VS.Germany(Vannover I)案中,人权法院直接否定了德国宪法法院长期坚持的“公共人物的隐私权保障范围小于普通人”的价值理论。因此·多元法律体系框架下的法律冲突只能通过法律体系间承认、司法机构的自我抑制以及司法对话而调节。

(2)Janneke Gerards,Pluralism,Deference and Margin of Appreciation,European Law Journal,vol.17,(December2010),p104.

(3)Alec Stone Sweet&Helen Keller,The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Order,in H,Keller&A.Stone,A Europe of Rights:The Impact of ECHR on National Legal System,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008,p14.作者认为欧洲人权法院具有的命令效力和控制能力较弱,唯一武器是要求缔约国赔偿申诉人的损失。

(4)Howard Charles Yourow,The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence,Martinus Nijhoff,1996,p6;Also see Yutaka Arai-Takahashi,The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and The Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR,Intersentia,2002.pl-2.

(5)Marisa Iglesias Vila,A Margin of Appreciation Doctrine for the European Convention of Human Rights:In search of Balance Between Democracy and Rights in International Sphere.Available at website:http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/SELA13-Iglesias-CV-Eng-20130508.pdf.p6.

(6)Cora S.Feingold,Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and the European Convention on Human Rights,Notre Dame Law Review,Vol.53.(October 1977),pl05-106.

(7)Thomas A.O'Donnell,The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine:Standard in the Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights,Human Rights Quarterly,Vol.4,(Winter 1982),p496。

(1)Yuval Shany,Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?,The European Journal of International Law,vol.16,(August 2006),p924.

(2)Jeffrey A.Brauch,The Margin of Appreciation and Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights:Threat to the Rule of Law,Columbia Journal of European Law,vol.11,(Winter 2004-2005),p125.

(3)Lord Hoffmann,The Universality of Human Rights,Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture,19 March 2009;Janneke Gerards,How to Improve the Necessity Test of European Court of Human Rights,International Journal of Constitutional Law,vol.11,(April 2013),p109.

(4)参见欧洲人权委员会认为《欧洲人权公约》第15条赋予了缔约国政府在紧急状态下克减履行公约义务的权利。

(5)Lawless vs.Ireland,332/57,Report of the Commission 19 December 1959.

(6)Yutaka Arai-Takahashi,The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine:A Theoretical Analysis of Strasbourg's Variable Geometry,in A.Follesdal,B.Peters&G.Ulfstein,eds 2013,Constituting Europe:The European Court of Human Rights in a National,European and Global Context,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013,p69-78.Takahashi教授认为边际裁量原则在人权法院的判决中具有四大功能:(1)寻找和确定法律事实;(2)分析与评价国内法;(3)分析与评价公约权利;(4)权衡个人权利与公共利益。

(7)Steven Greer,Interpretation and Discretion Under European Convention on Human Rights,Council of Europe Publishing,2000,p5.

(8)Ronald St John Macdonald,The Margin of Appreciation,in R.Macdonald,F.Matscher&H.Petzold eds.The European System for Protection of Human Rights,Martinus Nijhoff,1993,p192.Also see Johan Callewaert,Is there a Margin of Appreciation in Application of Article 2,3 and 4 of Convention,Human Rights Law Journal,vol.19,(January1998),p6-9.缔约国无法在人权公约第2、3和4条中享有任何边际裁量空间。

(9)Rasmussen vs.Denmark,8777/79,28 November 1984.人权法院认为“权利的范围受到客观环境、标的和背景的影响”。

(1)Handyside vs.UK,5493/72,Judgment 7 December 1972.

(2)Yuval Shany,Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?,The European Journal of International Uw,vol.16,(August 2006),p909-910.Shany从理论角度指出欧洲人权法院适用边际裁量原则体现出两个特征:(1)司法赞同性(judicial deference),人权法院会在某种限度内支持缔约国政府的决定,并且在此领域中尊重缔约国履行国际责任的决定。因此,国际法院不应该以自己的意见代替缔约国法院的裁量与分析。相反,国际法院应该在裁判过程中自我抑制(self-restraint)。(2)规范模式的宽松性,适用于边际裁量原则的国际法规范具有法条开放性(open-ended)和可裁量性(unsettled),因此这些国际法规范只能提供有限的导向,并且在国际法院认可的“合法性领域”内给予缔约国自由选择的空间。因此,不同的国家政府在差异性的客观条件下可以通过不同的方式履行公约义务。

(3)Humphrey Waldock,The Effectiveness of the System Set Up by the European Convention of Human Rights,Human Rights Law Journal,vol.1,(January 1980),p9.

(4)Vagrancy vs.Belgium,2832/66,2835/66,2899/66,judgment 18 November 1970.

(5)Jan Kratochvil,The Inflation of The Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights,Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights,vol.11,(August 2011),p329.

(6)Jeffrey A.Brauch,The Margin of Appreciation and Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights;Threat to the Rule of Law,Columbia Journal of European Law,vol.11,(Winter 2004—2005),pl29.

(1)Steven Greer,The European Convention on Human Rights;Achievement,Problem and Prospects,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2006,p212;Paul Mahoney,Marvelous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism,Human Rights Law Journal,vol 19,(January 1998),p1.时任人权法院立案部主任的Mahoney列举了法官主要确定边际裁量需考量的因素,(1)当不同缔约国对公约权利具有共同认识时,人权法院会相应地缩小缔约国的自由裁量空间;(2)权利的本质不可侵犯;(3)缔约国承担的义务属性(积极义务对应着宽泛的边际裁量空间,消极义务对应着有限或者狭小的边际裁量空间)I(4)缔约国在限制基本权利过程中追求的合法性目的(缔约国政府可以在道德领域获得巨大的自由裁量空间);(5)被规范行为的社会重要性;(6)该案件的客观环境(例如国家是否经历着紧急状态);(7)公约条款的措辞(例如,公约第5条已经明确规定了对自由权的限制方式,因此缔约国享有较小的边际裁量空间)。

(2)Lingens vs.Austria,9815/82,8 July 1986.

(3)Steven Greer,What's Wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights,Human Rights Quarterly,vol.30,(August,2008),p697;Steven Greer,The Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights:Universal Principle or Margin of Appreciation,ULC Human Rights Review,vol.3,(October 2014),p7-8.Greer教授认为人权法院适用边际裁量反映要遵守三个原则:(1)权利原则,在民主的社会中,国内法院和人权法院要通过法律的方式保障人权;(2)民主原则,在民主社会中,民主的非司法机构有权在法律的框架内追求和保障公共美德和公共利益;(3)公约权利优先理论,在公约条款的规定中,人权法院应该调和权利原则和民主原则,将公约权利置于程序或者证据上的优先性,从而通过保障基本权利为出发点,考量缔约国限制措施和决定是否具有合法性。

(4)Sunday Times vs.UK,6538/74,26 April 1979.

(1)Jan Kratochvil.The Inflation of The Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights.Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights,vol.11,(August 2011),p332.

(2)参见范继增:《多元结构下欧洲基本权利保障体系:欧盟法与〈欧洲人权公约〉间交互式发展与影响》,载《厦门大学法律评论》,第27辑,2016,第127页。

(3)George Letsas,Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,Vol.26,(Winter2006)p709-710.

(4)George Letsas,Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation,Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,Vol.26,(Winter2006)p721.

(5)Rolv Ryssdall,The Coming of Age of the of the European Convention of Human Rights.European Human Rights Law Review,vol.18,(January 1996),p24.

(6)George Letsas,The ECHR as a Living Instrument:Its Meaning and Legitimacy,in A.Follesdal,B.Peters&G.Ulfstein eds,Constituting Europe:The European Court of Human Rights in a National,European and Global Context,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013,p721.

(1)Immobiliare Saffi vs.Italy,22274/93,28 July 1999.

(2)James and Others vs.UK,8793/79,21 February 1986.

(3)Micheal Theodossiou Ltd vs.Cyprus,31811/04,15 January 2009;Antonopoulou vs.Greece,49000/06,16 April 2009.

(4)Axioglou vs.Greece,45145/06,12 March 2009.

(5)Benet vs.The Czech Republic,31555/05,21 October 2010.

(1)Lautsi vs.Italy,30814/06,3 November 2009.

(2)Dotninick McGoldrick.Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public Life——Crucifixes in the Classroom.Human Rights Law Review,vol.11.(September 2011).p451.

(3)Giulio Itzcovich.One.None and One Hundred Thousands Margins of Appreciation:The Lautsi Case.Human Rights Law Review,vol.13,(September 2013).p3.

(1)Stec&Others vs.United Kingdom,65731/01.12 April 2006.

(2)Dean Spielmann,Allowing the Rights Margin the European Court of Human Rights and National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine:Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review.CELS Working Paper,2012,pl3.

(3)Evens vs.UK,6339/05,10 April 2007.

(4)例如X&Y vs.Netherlands,8978/80,judgment 26 March 19851 Dudgeon vs.UK,7525/76,judgment 22October 1981;Christine Goodwin vs.UK,28957/95,11 July 2002.

(5)Schalk and Kopf vs.Austria,30141/04,22 November 2010.

(1)参见范继增:《欧洲多层级框架下的人权保障机制——欧盟法与〈欧洲人权公约〉间的交互性影响》,载《中山大学法律评论》,2015第3期,第13卷,第33页。

(2)Gas and Debois vs.France,25951/07,15 March 2012.

(1)X and Others vs.Austria,19010/07,19 February 2013.

(2)A,B and C vs.Ireland,25579/05,16 December 2010.

(3)Dahlab vs.Switzerland,42393/98,15 February 2001.

(4)Yutaka Arai-Takahashi,The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and The Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR,Intersentia,2002,pl03.

(5)Steven Greer,Interpretation and Discretion Under European Convention on Human Rights,Council of Europe Publishing,2000,p5.

(6)Yutaka Arai-Takahashi,The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and The Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR,Intersentia,2002,p16.

(7)Andrew Legg,The Margin of Appreciation in International and Human Rights Law:Deference and Proportionality,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2012,p180.

(8)参见范继增;《欧洲人权法院适用比例原则的功能与逻辑》,载《欧洲研究》2015年第5期。

(1)George Letsas,The ECHR as a Living Instrument:Its Meaning and Legitimacy,in A.Follesdal,B.Peters&G.Ulfstein eds.Constituting Europe:The European Court of Human Rights in a National,European and Global Context,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013,p711.

(2)Steven Greer,Interpretation and Discretion Under European Convention on Human Rights,Council of Europe Publishing,2000,pl5.

(3)Mathieu Mohin and Clerfayt vs.Belgium,9267/81,2 March 1987.

(4)Aziz vs.Cyprus,69949/01,22 September 2004.

(5)Hirst vs.UK,74025/01,6 October 2005.

(1)Aerts vs.Belgium,61/1997/845/1501,30 July 1998.

(2)Apostol vs.Georgia,40765/02,28 November 2006.

(3)Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,London,Bloombery,1977,at xi.

(4)Steven Greer,Interpretation and Discretion Under European Convention on Human Rights,Council of Europe Publishing,2000,p17.

(5)Stephen P.Marks,The European Convention on Human Rights and its'Democratic Society',British Yearbook of International Law,vol.66,(June 1996),p211.

(6)Steven Greer,Interpretation and Discretion Under European Convention on Human Rights,Council of Europe Publishing,2000,p6.

(7)Stephen P.Marks,The European Convention on Human Rights and its'Democratic Society',British Yearbook of International Law,vol.66,(June 1996),p211.

(8)United Communist Party of Turkey vs.Turkey,133/1996/752/951,30 January 1998.

(1)Young,James and Webster vs.UK,7601/76,7806/77,13 August 1981.

(2)Kjeldsen.Busk Madsen&Pedersen vs.Denmark,5095/71,5920/72,5926/72,7 December 1976.

(3)Winterwerp vs.The Netherlands,6301/73,24 October 1979.

(4)De Wilde,Ooms and Versyp vs.Belgium,2832/66,2835/66 and 2899/66,18 June 1971.

(5)Matthew Saul,The European Court of Human Rights'Margin of Appreciation and the Process of National Parliament,Human Rights Law Review,vol.15,(December 2015),p762-766.

(6)Animal Defender International vs.UK,48876/08,22 April 2013.

(7)Robert Spano,Universality or Diversity of Human Rights?Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity,Human Rights Law Review,Vol.14,(September 2014),p498.

(8)S.A.S vs.France,43835/11,1 July 2014.

(9)Murphy vs.Ireland,44179/98,10 July 2003.

(1)Juan Cianciardo,The Principle of Proportionality:its Dimensions and Limits,available at website:http://works,bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=juan-cianciardo.p3.

(2)Alec Stone Sweet&Jud Mathews,Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism,Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,vol.47,(March 2008),p75.

(3)Jud Matthews&Alec Stone Sweet,All Things in Proportion?American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing,Emory Law Journal,vol.60,(April 2011),pl06.

(4)Dieter Grimm,Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence,University of Toronto Law Review,vol.57,(Spring 2007),p389.

(5)Jud Matthews&Alec Stone Sweet,All Things in Proportion?American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing,Emory Law Journal,vol.60,(April 2011),p107.

(6)Robert Alexy,Constitutional Rights and Proportionality,Revus,vol.22,(August,2014),p54.

(7)Robert Alexy,A Theory of Constitutional Rights,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002,p84-86.

(8)Tor-Inge Harbo,The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law,European Law Journal,vol.16,(March 2010),pl66.

(9)Robert Alexy,Constitutional Rights,Balancing and Rationality,Ratio Juris,vol.16,(June 2003),pl36.

(10)Robert Alexy,Constitutional Rights and Proportionality,Revus,vol.22,(August,2014),p66-67.(T.Jeremy Gunn,Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis,Emory International Law Review,vol.19,(Summer2005),p467-468.

(1)Belgian Liguistic Case,1474/62,23 July 1968.

(2)Soering vs.UK,14038/88,07 July 1989.

(3)Yutaka Arai-Takahashi,The Margin of Appreciation Etoctrine and The Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR,Intersentia,2002,p16.

(4)Edition Plon vs.France,58148/00,18 August 2004.

(5)Jonas Christoffersen,Fair Balance:Proportionality,Subsidiarity and Primarity in European Convention on Human Rights,The Hague;Martinus Nijhoff,2009,pl91.

(1)Janneke Gerards,How to Improve the Necessity Test of European Court of Human Rights,International Journal of Constitutional Law,vol.11,(April 2013),p482.

(2)Daróczy vs.Hungary,44378/05,1 July 2008.

(3)Observer and Guardian vs.UK,13585/88,26 November 1991.

(4)Janneke Gerards,Pluralism,Deference and Margin of Appreciation,European Law Journal,vol.17,(December2010),p483.;Yutaka Arai-Takahashi,The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and The Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR,Intersentia,2002,pl4.

(5)rper and others vs.Turkey,14526/07,14747/07,15022/07,15737/07,36137/07,47245/07,50371/07,50372/07 and 54637/07,20 October 2009.

(6)Glor vs.Switzerland,13444/04,30 April 2009.

(7)Janneke Gerards,Pluralism,Deference and Margin of Appreciation,European Law Journal,vol.17,(December2010),p471.

(1)Orban and others vs.France,20985/05,15 January 2009.

(2)Sociéde Conception de Presse et d'Edition et Ponson vs.France,26935/05,5 March 2009.

(3)George Letsas,The ECHR as a Living Instrument:Its Meaning and Legitimacy,in A.Follesdal,B.Peters&G.Ulfstein eds.Constituting Europe:The European Court of Human Rights in a National,European and Global Context,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013,pl06.

(1)Tyrer vs.UK,5856/72,25 April 1978.

(2)Marckx vs.Belgium,6833/74,13 June 1979.

(3)Dudgeon vs.UK,7525/76,24 February 1983.

(4)John L.Murray,The Influence of the European Convention on Fundamental Human Rights on Community Law,Fordham International Law Journal,vol.33,(April 2011),pl406.

(5)Goodwin vs.UK,17488/90,27 March 1997.

(6)Rees vs.UK,9532/81,17 October 1986.

(1)John L.Murray.The Influence of the European Convention on Fundamental Human Rights on Community Law,Fordham International Law Journal,vol.33,(April 2011),pl407.

(2)Demir and Baykara vs.Turkey 34503/97,12 November 2008.

(3)Bayatyan vs.Armenia,23459/03,7 July 2011.

(4)范继增:《欧洲多层级框架下的人权保障机制——欧盟法与〈欧洲人权公约)间的交互性影响》,载《中山大学法律评论》,2015第3期,第13卷.第50-52页。上诉人Mendizahal是一位西班牙籍巴斯克人。在她旅居法国期间·法国政府因其在公民来源一栏中填写“欧盟”并且怀疑她与埃塔分离组织有密切的联系,所以拒绝给她颁发长期居留证。人权法院认为法国当局并没有依照法律的规定颁发给合法申请人长期居留证,所以裁决其违反了人权公约第8条保障家庭生活的权利。法院指出,“人权法院会依据共同体法规定的义务给予合法入境的居民签发居留证的规定解释了人权公约第8条”。人权法院在大幅度地援引了共同体立法的规定和Commission vs.Belgium案判决后要求法国当局立即履行颁发签证的义务。在Maslov案中,保加利亚籍申请人因其在奥地利境内违反了刑事法律的规定被判处有期徒刑外加10年驱除出境的刑罚。由于在奥地利服刑期间表现良好,原告希望奥地利当局可以重新考虑对他判处的10年驱除出境刑事处罚。奥地利当局认为对原告的重新评价仅限于作出最终判决之前的时间。人权法院依据第64/221号欧盟法令和相应的共同体法院的解释拒绝了奥地利当局的观点.其认为“法院要审查的是针对原告现实的驱除行为是否符合公约的规定,而不是最终的驱除令是否符合公约的规定”。